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INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1980, the United States had a discriminatory immigration policy primarily based on geographical, numerical, and ideoThe United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in INS v. CardozoFonseca, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), just as this Article went into publication.
See 54 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 85-782); see also infra note 213.
The question presented for review is whether an alien's burden of proof in establishing eligibility for political asylum is equivalent to his burden of proof in
establishing eligibility for withholding of deportation. 54 U.S.L.W. at 3546.
*
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logical considerations.1 In an effort to eliminate the discriminatory aspects of this policy, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of
1980 (the Refugee Act). 2 Congressional sponsors of the Refugee
Act sought to establish a coherent and more humanitarian immigration policy.3 Many problems arising since the enactment of the
Refugee Act, however, have thwarted the development of such a
policy. One of these problems is the lack of a well-defined, reasonable burden of proof that an alien must meet before he will be
granted either asylum or withholding of deportation under the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the INA) 4 as amended
by the Refugee Act.
When an alien seeks withholding of deportation, he must establish a "clear probability" that he would face persecution if he
were to return to his homeland. 5 When an alien seeks asylum, on
the other hand, he first must qualify as a "refugee," which is defined as an alien having a "well-founded fear" that he would be
persecuted if he were to return to his homeland.6 If an alien
meets the refugee definition, then the Attorney General has discretion to grant or deny the refugee asylum.7 The United States
circuit courts of appeals have disagreed on whether these two
burdens of proof are quantitatively different or whether the terms
are simply an innocuous difference in language."
1.

See Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis:A Legislative history of the

Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Anker & Posner, Legislative History].

2. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (94 Stat.) 102
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
3. Congress intended the Act to bring the United States into compliance
with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan.
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force
with respect to the United States Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
See Comment, Refuge in America: What Burden of Proof?, 17 J. MAR. L. REV.
81, 96-98 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Refuge in America]. See gener-

ally Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1 (discussing in detail the
legislative history of the Act).
4. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C. (1982)).
5. See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2501 (1984); Dally v. INS, 744
F.2d 1191, 1195 (6th Cir. 1984); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.

1977). 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) governs withholding of deportation.
6. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1985).
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982) provides for asylum.
7. Bolanos-Hernandez,767 F.2d at 1282.
8. Compare Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982) (same burden under
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Because of the conflicting views among the circuits of the appropriate burden of proof, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Stevic v. Sava.9 Although immigration practitioners hoped that the Court in Stevic would finally resolve the
controversy, the Stevic decision did not conclusively set forth the
necessary burden of proof for asylum cases. 10 The only clear holding of Stevic was that the clear probability standard remains the
proper burden of proof for aliens seeking withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the INA and that clear probability
means "more likely than not."1' 1 Because of this narrow holding,
debate rages on in the lower courts over the appropriate burden
of proof in asylum cases and over the comparability of that burden of proof with the burden in cases that involve the withhold12
ing of deportation.
This Article explores the burden of proof debate. First, it
delves into the historical developments leading up to the Refugee
Act then focuses on the Refugee Act's legislative history and on
case law prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Stevic. Second,
the Article discusses the Stevic opinion and the interpretation of
Stevic in subsequent circuit court decisions. Third, it analyzes
Stevic and the subsequent cases. The Article concludes with a
look at what the future holds for the Refugee Act.

both standards) with Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982) (clear
probability requires greater showing), rev'd sub noma. INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct.
2489 (1984). See also Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982) (adopting Second Circuit's approach in Stevic), vacated, 747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 2173 (1985).
9. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noma. INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489,
2492 (1984).
10. See Helton, Stevic: The Decision and Its Implications, 3 IMMIGRATION L.
REP. 49 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Helton, Stevic Implications];Steinberg, The
Standard of Proof in Asylum Cases After I.N.S. v. Stevic, 13(4) IMMIGRATION
NEWSLETrER 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg, The Standard After
Stevie].
11. INS v. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2498, 2501.
12. Compare Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (clear
probability heavier burden than well-founded fear) with Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d
832 (3d Cir. 1984) (same burden under both standards).
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. A Brief Overview of the United States Asylum Law Before
1968
Before 1968, United States asylum law developed through responses to crises rather than through planned implementation of
comprehensive policy objectives.13 During this time period, aliens
could seek refuge in the United States in only one of three ways:
(1) withholding of deportation; 1416 (2) conditional entry; 5 or (3) Attorney General's parole power.
The withholding of deportation provision of the INA applied to
aliens already in the United States, but did not reach those aliens
seeking refuge at United States borders.1 7 To qualify under the

13.

See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unful-

filled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 243-44 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Helton, Unfulfilled Promise].
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964). This provision was enacted as § 243(h) of the
INA. It read as follows:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to physical persecution ...
Id.
15. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 912-13 (1965) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a)(7)(A)(i) (1976) (repealed 1980)). An alien's entry into the United States
was "conditional" because aliens could acquire permanent resident status only
after spending two years in the United States. This amendment created the first
permanent basis for refugee admissions. Until Congress passed the 1980 Refugee
Act, however, only persons from specific countries could apply for asylum. Comment, Political Asylum and Withholding of Deportation:Defining the Appropriate Standard of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21 SAN DEGO L. Rnv.

171, 175 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, PoliticalAsylum].
16. INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1964) provided:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall
not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of
such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in
the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the
United States.
17. See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2493; Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1958).
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withholding of deportation provision prior to 1968, the alien definitely had to show a "clear probability of persecution" if he were
to return to his home country.1 8 Until 1965, physical persecution
had to be involved.1 9 Even if the alien did show a clear
probability of persecution, the statute gave the Attorney General
discretion to reject the claim.2 0 Because this was a discretionary
grant of power by Congress, the courts could only review the At21
torney General's actions under an abuse of discretion standard.
While the withholding of deportation provision only affected
aliens already in the United States, the conditional entry provision, as the forerunner of the current asylum provision, focused
on admission of refugees who were still in other countries. 22 In
23
fact, aliens within the United States could not apply for asylum.
Under the limited scope of the conditional entry provision, only
potential refugees from communist or communist-dominated
countries, or countries in the Middle East, could apply.24 An alien
had to convince an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
officer that he had been persecuted or that he feared persecution
because of his race, religion, or political opinion. 25 Because eligibility determinations generally occurred outside of the United
States, judicial review of the INS decision ordinarily did not take
place.2 6 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and lower level
hearing officers, however, did review these cases. 27 These deci18.

See, e.g., Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Joseph, 13

I. & N. Dec. 70 (B.I.A. 1968); In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (B.I.A. 1967). See
also Helton, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 13, at 244-45.

19. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h). Before 1965, an alien had to
show that substantial harm would result to his being. Mere economic or social
harm would not satisfy the definition. See Note, The Right of Asylum Under
United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. Rnv., 1125, 1127 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Asylum].
20. See Helton, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 13, at 244.
21. Id. The alien's position in this matter was further complicated by the
Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) stringent application of the standard. Id.
at 244 n.8.
22. See Comment, Political Asylum, supra note 15, at 175.
23. Id.
24. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984).
25. Id.
26. Helton, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 13, at 245.
27. An immigration judge makes the initial determination on an alien's application for withholding of deportation and/or asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8 (1985).
Decisions by the immigration judge are appealable to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1985). The alien can appeal the BIA's determination
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sions indicated that the burden of proof standard for this provision was considerably lower than the clear probability burden
used in withholding of deportation cases.2" Congress, however, repealed the conditional entry provisions in 1980.29
The third manner in which aliens could seek entry into the
United States was through the Attorney General's parole power.
This provision gave the Attorney General discretion to "parole"
an alien into the United States for a limited time for emergency
reasons.30 The parole authority generally had neither the numerical restrictions like those imposed under the conditional entry
provision, nor did it have the geographic and ideological limitations which accompanied the withholding provision.3 ' Although
the parole power did not have these restrictions, the Attorney
the power only to admit persons fleeing
General generally used
32
communist countries.

B. The 1968-1980 Period
1. Accession to the Protocol
In 1968 Congress appeared to liberalize United States immigration policy when it acceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).3 3 The Protocol officially bound its signatories to articles 2 through 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention).3 4 The Protocol is significant because its language appears to lessen the
burden on an alien seeking withholding of deportation and/or
asylum. The Protocol defines a refugee as one who:
directly to a United States Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1982).
28. See In re Ugricic, 14 I. & N. Dec. 384 (1972); In re Adamska, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 201 (1967); In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (B.I.A. 1967); see also Stevic v.
Sava, 678 F.2d at 405.
29. See Refugee Act § 203(b), 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (94 Stat.)
107, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1153.

30. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982)).
31. See Helton, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 13, at 245-46.
32. See Helton, Stevic Implications, supra note 10, at 51.
33. Protocol, supra note 3; see Comment, PoliticalAsylum, supra note 15, at
177; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U.
FLA. L. REv. 539, 544 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Right of Asylum].
34. Signed July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150

[hereinafter cited as Convention]; Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, § 1, 19 U.S.T. at

6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (section binding signatories).
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owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or,
35
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

The Protocol also proscribes, through incorporation of the Convention, any action by a signatory to return a refugee to any territory "where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion." 36
The provisions of the Protocol differ from then-existing United
States immigration law in a number of ways.37 First, the wellfounded fear language of the refugee definition in the Protocol
appears to be more lenient than the clear probability standard
imposed on aliens seeking relief under the withholding of deportation provision.38 Second, prior United States law defined persecution as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as

35. Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, § 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
This definition expanded the refugee definition found in the Convention by
eliminating a requirement that the person must have become a refugee because
of world events occurring prior to 1951. Compare id. with Convention, supra
note 34, art. I, § A(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The United
States, however, never acceded to the Convention itself. See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at
2494 n.9; see also Comment, Political Asylum, supra note 15, at 177. The
United Nations has published a practical guide to assist in making refugee status determinations under the Convention or the Protocol. See OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter cited as

U.N. HANDBOOK]. An entire section of the Handbook is devoted to interpreting
the Convention and Protocol terms.

36. Convention, supra note 34, art. 33, § 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S.
at 152 (incorporated by reference at Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, § 1, 19 U.S.T.

at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268).
37. Comment, Political Asylum, supra note 15, at 177-78; Note, The Right
of Asylum, supra note 33, at 544.

38. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d at 405. The Convention's history indicates that
the drafters intended for the new standard to be less stringent. United Nations
Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems 39 (E/1618; E/AC 32/5) (1950); see also U.N. HANDBooK, supra note 35, 38-45.
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offensive.""9 In contrast, the Protocol more simply defines persecution as a threat to one's life or freedom. 40 Third, under the Protocol, an alien may apply for asylum if he originally left his home
country in flight from persecution or if he is unable to return because of circumstances of persecution that have arisen since his
departure. 4 ' In contrast, an alien could apply for asylum under
prior United States law only if the alien fled his home country
specifically to avoid persecution. Fourth, the Protocol does not
contain the ideological and geographical limitations that were
previously imposed by United States law.4 2 Last, the Protocol
strictly limits the Attorney General's discretion to deport an alien
who qualifies as a refugee. Under the Protocol, the Attorney General has discretion to deport only if he has reasonable grounds to
believe that the alien presents a national security risk or if the
alien has been convicted of a serious crime and constitutes a potential danger to the community.43 Conversely, prior United
States law granted the Attorney General broader discretion.
Although the Protocol appears to be a liberalization of United
States law that existed in 1968, the legislative history of the Protocol's Senate ratification seems to indicate that the United
States Government did not intend to liberalize the law. Both the
Senate and the executive branch apparently thought that the
Protocol did not significantly change the existing United States
immigration law.44 Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, a Senate
sponsor of the Protocol ratification, testified that the Protocol
"would not impinge adversely upon the Federal and State laws of

39. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
40. See Convention, supra note 34, art. 33, § 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189
U.N.T.S. at 176 (incorporated by reference at Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, § 1,
19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268). Obviously, an alien would have less

difficulty in establishing a threat to his freedom under the Protocol definition
than he would have in establishing an oppressive infliction of suffering or harm
as required under earlier United States law.
41. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
2.24(A)(b) (1979).
42. See id.; supra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
43. Convention, supra note 34, art. 33, § 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S.
at 176 (incorporated by reference at Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, § 1, 19 U.S.T.
at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268).
44. See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2494; see also Helton, Unfulfilled Promise,
supra note 13, at 246-47. But see Comment, Refuge in America, supra note 3, at
98-99 & n.102 (language of Senate hearings on Protocol is ambiguous and sus-

ceptible to various interpretations).
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1985]

this country. 4 5 A State Department official also specifically testified that "existing regulations which have to do with deportation
would permit the Attorney General sufficient flexibility to enforce
the provisions of this convention which are not presently con'4
tained in the Immigration and Nationality Act." 6
2. Administrative and Judicial Review
While the legislative history of the Protocol ratification indicates that Congress did not intend to change the existing immigration laws, some courts, nevertheless, began to apply the Protocol's "well-founded fear" burden to withholding of deportation
cases. Courts adopted the standard despite the absence of additional congressional action because of the flexibility in the withholding of deportation provision.47 In contrast, the BIA rejected
this approach, instead opting to retain the clear probability stan-

dard.4 8 Although some courts agreed with the BIA's decision,49

other courts held that the Protocol ratification did change the
withholding burden to a lesser well-founded fear burden." Still
other courts concocted various adaptations of the two standards.5 1

45. 114 CONG. REc. 29,391 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mansfield).
In U.S. v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., No. 84-6-00858, slip op. 84-117, (Ct.
Int'l Trade Oct. 16, 1984), the court specifically ruled that forfeiture of goods
under § 592 is not an ordinary remedy in addition to monetary penalties imposed under that section. Furthermore, the court ruled that Customs should not
circumvent § 592's limitations on seizure by resorting to other statutory remedies, such as civil arrest of imported merchandise.
46.

COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON PROTOCOL RELATING TO REFU-

Ex. K, S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968)
(statement of Elizabeth McDowell of the State Department's Office of the Legal
Advisor); accord 114 CONG. REC. 27,757 (1968) (President's message transmitting
GEES TO ACCOMPANY

the Protocol); 114 CONG. REc. 27,844 (1968) (statement of Laurence A. Dawson,

Acting Deputy Director, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of
State).
47. Helton, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 13, at 247.
48. See, e.g., In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (B.I.A. 1973) (discussing legislative history of Protocol ratification and concluding that clear probability was
still the proper burden in withholding cases); In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70
(B.I.A. 1968).
49. See, e.g., Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977); CisternasEstay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Rosa
v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971).

50. See, e.g., Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1977); Zamora v.
INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
51. See, e.g., Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable per-
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Most courts never really addressed the possible distinctions between the two standards. Two courts, however, expressly considered the issue, and they came to opposite conclusions. The Fifth
Circuit in Coriolanv. INS,5 2 concluded that the well-founded fear
burden was less stringent than the clear probability standard.5 3 In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Kashani v. INS" held that the
'55
two standards "will in practice converge.'

3. Administrative Reaction to Embarrassment
This general confusion and lack of a coherent and humanitarian asylum policy, even after adoption of the Protocol,
culminated in an event which dramatically exemplified the policy's illogical results. In 1970, in an incident known as the
Kudirka Affair, a Lithuanian sailor leaped on board a United
States Coast Guard ship from a Soviet fishing boat. 56 This incident took place while both the Coast Guard cutter and the Soviet
fishing vessel were in United States territorial waters. The sailor
immediately requested asylum in the United States, but the INS
denied his request without conducting any investigation because
the sailor was technically in the United States when he requested
asylum.57 Instead of providing refuge for Kudirka, the United
States government allowed five Soviet sailors to come on board
the Coast Guard ship to forcibly return him to the Soviet ship.
The sailors proceeded to physically whip him into submission,
and they carried him back to the Soviet vessel wrapped inside a
blanket.58
The immense embarrassment of this incident eventually led the
United States Department of State to issue a declaration stating
that under the Protocol, all asylum requests must be given full
secution"); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 920 (1971); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969) ("probability of
persecution").
52. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 997 n.8.
54. 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977).

55. Id. at 379.
56. See generally O'Brien, The Kudirka Affair: Bringing Sanity to the Laws
of Asylum, 8 HuM. RTS. 38 (1980); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REviEw

oF U.S.

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS

AND POLICIES, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1980).

57. See supra text accompanying note 23.
58. O'Brien, supra note 56, at 39-40.

19851

THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980

consideration, regardless of whether the applicant was physically
inside or outside of the United States."9 Finally, in 1974, the INS
promulgated new regulations which allowed aliens physically present in the United States to apply for asylum.6 0 These new regulations, however, proved to be far short of the reform needed to
cope with the subsequent heavy influx of Indochinese, Cubans,
and Haitians into the. United States. Consequently, the United
States Government responded inadequately to the challenges created by the subsequent influx of immigrants."1
4.

The Legislative Response to Administrative and Judicial
Inaction

Shortly after ratification of the Protocol, some members of
Congress began to realize that the INS planned to continue with
the same course of action as if the Protocol had not changed anything.6 2 To remedy this situation, members of Congress, in 1969
and 1970, introduced three bills proposing changes in the refugee
provisions.6 All of the bills provided a new definition for "refugee" that did not include geographical or ideological restrictions.
Specifically, the language of Senator Kennedy's and Congressman
Feighan's bill most closely aligned with the actual language of the
Protocol because it eliminated the Attorney General's discretionary power and enlarged the bases of persecution under which an
alien could seek asylum.6 4 Conversely, bills separately sponsored
59. General Policy Statement, 66 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 124 (1972), reprinted in 37
Fed. Reg. 3447 (1972); see also Comment, Political Asylum, supra note 15, at
179.
60. See 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1974) (superseded by the Refugee Act of 1980);
Note, The Right of Asylum, supra note 33, at 545.
61. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 141, 143; see also Comment, PoliticalAsylum, supra note 15,
at 179.
62. See Helton, Stevic Implications, supra note 10, at 52.
63. Senator Kennedy introduced one bill in the Senate. See S. 3202, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 36,964 (1969). Congressman Feighan introduced
the House version of this same bill. See H.R. 15,093, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REc. 36,942 (1969) (companion to S. 3202). Two other Congressmen introduced two more pieces of legislation in the House. See H.R. 17,370, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 13,823 (1970) (sponsored by Congressman Rodino);
H.R. 9112, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6731 (1969) (sponsored by Congressman Celler). See generally Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note
1, at 20-30 (outlining reform proposals made between 1970 and 1976).
64. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 22.
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by Congressmen Rodino and Celler kept those provisions in much
the same form as they had been. 5 Congressman Rodino's bill also
endorsed much greater use of the Attorney General's parole
power, while the Kennedy/Feighan bill provided for use of parole
only in emergency situations and for temporary periods of time.6
A House Judiciary Subcommittee conducted hearings on all
three House bills in July and August 1970.7 Testimony showed
that the sponsors had three major objectives: (1) to enact a refugee definition which would lead to a more appropriate admissions
policy; (2) to set forth new and less stringent numerical limitations on admission; and (3) to develop a refugee admissions procedure that would give Congress more control of the entire pro-

cess.6 " Most of the testimony on the Kennedy/Feighan bill was

favorable, including that of State Department and Justice Department witnesses6 9 That bill was voted out of the House Judiciary Committee with a favorable recommendation; however, the
Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization killed
the bill in the Senate. 70 Neither Congressman Rodino's nor Congressman Celler's bill received a favorable recommendation by
the House Judiciary Committee.7 '
In 1973 Congressman Rodino reintroduced a bill that was similar to his earlier legislation. 2 This time, however, the new bill's
73
refugee definition was much closer to the Protocol's definition.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23-24.
67. Immigration:Hearingson H.R. 9112, H.R. 15,092 and H.R. 17,370 Before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1971) [hereinafter cited as INA Hearings].
68. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 22.
69. See INA Hearings,supra note 75, at 161 (testimony of Barbara M. Watson, Administrator of Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs). The State Department's only apparent reservation about the bill was the foreign policy implications of such a change. Id. at 168.
70. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 25. Senator
James Eastland (D-Miss.) chaired that subcommittee as well as the full Senate
Judiciary Committee. Senator Eastland, an ardent opponent of refugee reform
efforts, used his power to prevent any favorable action on S. 3202. Senator Kennedy, as Chairman of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected
with Refugees and Escapees, possessed no legislative jurisdiction over the bilL
Id. at 25 n.71. Refugee reform legislation (i.e., the Refugee Act of 1980) did not
pass until 1980-two years after Senator Eastland resigned from the Senate.
71. Id. at 25.
72. H.R. 981, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 61 (1973).
73. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 25.
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This new bill retained the previous bill's provision concerning the
exclusive use of the Attorney General's parole power as the sole
means of refugee admission into this country.7 4 Hearings on the
bill resulted in significant changes in the bill's parole provision."
The Subcommittee adopted amendments limiting use of the parole provision to "exceptional or emergency circumstances." '6
Rodino's new bill also emphasized immigration reform in the
Western Hemisphere. 7 As amended, the bill also proposed a

much broader and nondiscriminatory refugee policy, and it created a Western Hemisphere refugee preference without any ideological restrictions. s On September 26, 1973, after a favorable
committee recommendation, the full House of Representatives
passed H.R. 981.79 The Senate companion bill, however, once
again died a quiet death, buried somewhere deep within the confines of the Senate Judiciary Committee."0
In 1975 members of Congress introduced three more immigration reform bills.8 ' Hearings on these proposals brought out growing congressional concern over the ad hoc nature of emergency
parole decisions made by the Attorney General. 2 Congressman

74. H.R. 981, supra note 72, § 9.
75. See generally Western Hemisphere Immigration:Hearings on H.R. 981
Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 246-57 (1973) (testimony of Francis L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to
Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs, Dep't of State; and Laurence A.
Dawson, Senior Adviser on Refugee Affairs, on the parole provision).
76. H.R. REP. No. 461, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
77. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 25. Although the
earlier 1965 Amendments presented significant changes, they did not seek conformity of the Western and Eastern Hemisphere preference systems. Id. at 20.
78. Id. at 26-27.
79. 119 CONG. REc. 31,477 (1973).
80. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 28; note 70,
supra
81. H.R. 367, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 193 (1975) (sponsored by
Congressman Eilberg); H.R. 981, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 504
(1975) (sponsored by Congressman Rodino); H.R. 10,323, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
121 CONG. REc. 33,719 (1975) (the Administration's bill).
82. Western HemisphereImmigration: Hearings on H.R. 367, H.R. 981, and
H.R. 10,328 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 73-74

(1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson H.R. 367]. Congressman Eilberg was
the new Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee holding hearings on
the proposed refugee reform legislation. Anker & Posner, Legislative History,
supra note 1, at 29.
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Eilberg, in particular, urged adoption of uniform standards and
criteria in this area including more congressional involvement.8 3
The House Judiciary Committee also recognized that in light of
the recent problems and then-existing trouble spots around the
world, further study might be necessary before adopting the Protocol refugee definition.8 4 Upon the recommendation of Congressman Eilberg, the committee agreed to sever the refugee provisions
from the three bills.8 5 Having postponed consideration of the bulk
of the immigration reform proposals by severing the refugee definition provisions, the Committee quickly reported out a noncon-

troversial bill which, although subsequently enacted into law,8 6
87
did little to help the situation.
In 1976 the evacuation, parole, and resettlement of 130,000 Indochinese again highlighted the immense problems of an immigration policy relying so heavily on ad hoc parole decisions., At
this time, Congress became increasingly concerned with the executive branch's use of the parole power to circumvent the statutory limitations on the number of aliens that could be allowed
into the United States. This concern culminated with more congressional hearings"" and with consideration of two more pieces of
legislation that sought to institute refugee policy reform.90 These

83. Hearings on H.R. 367, supra note 82, at 74.
84. Id. at 74-75; see also Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1,
at 29 & n.91 (discussing problems encountered with Chilean and Indochinese
parole programs during the preceding year).
85. Hearingson H.R. 367, supra note 82, at 74.
86. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 54-571, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws (90 Stat.) 2703.
87. The bill extended the seventh preference, a provision of the 1965
Amendments, to Western Hemisphere aliens; however, the bill retained the narrow refugee definition. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 2728.
88. See generally id. at 30-42 (discussing Indochinese Parole Program and
congressional reaction).
89. Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearings on H.R. 3056
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Int'l Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Admission]; Admission of Refugees into the United States, Part II:
Hearings on Indochinese Refugees and U.S. Refugee Policy Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Admission,
Part II].
90. H.R. 3056, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 3431 (1977); H.R. 7175,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 14,648 (1977). H.R. 7175 was the successor

19851

THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980

hearings illustrated the growing clash between the executive and
legislative branches. The House Subcommittee, led by Congressman Eilberg, pushed for formal statutory consultation provisions
in which the executive branch would have to consult Congress
before exercising its parole power. The Administration, on the
other hand, complained that even informal consultation requirements hindered its ability to handle emergency situations.9 1
Congress illustrated its growing exasperation with the executive
branch by amending the refugee reform bills to further restrict
the executive branch's power. Congress amended the bills by
placing numerical limitations on the executive branch's use of its
emergency parole powers, by restricting the executive branch's
use of its parole power to two specific categorical situations, and
by allowing Congress much more control over emergency refugee
programs.2 Appearing before the Subcommittee, Administration
witnesses argued that the executive branch needed flexibility to
respond appropriately to international refugee crises. According
to these witnesses, the new provisions in the reform bills would
frustrate the needed flexibility.9 3 Representatives of agencies that
provided voluntary assistance to refugees also testified against
these new provisions.9 4 While the refugee reform bills in general,
and these new provisions in particular, received significant attento H.R. 3056. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 33.
91. See Hearingson Admission, supra note 89, at 1, 67-70. The Ford Administration had agreed not to exercise its parole power if either the House or Senate Judiciary Committee voted against its use by a majority vote. The Carter
Administration, however, refused to be bound by that agreement. See Anker &
Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 31-32 & n.107.
92. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 34. One of the new
provisions provided for a legislative veto of any exercise of the Attorney General's parole power. Id at 35. A similar legislative veto provision, which allowed
one House of Congress to override the Attorney General's decision to suspend
the deportation of an alien, was already in another section of the INA. See 8
U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). This latter provision led to the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Chadha involved a legislative veto that overturned the Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation of an alien. The Court held that the legislative veto
provision was an unconstitutional usurpation of authority that the United States
Constitution had specifically delegated to the executive branch. 462 U.S. at 95455, 959.
93. See, e.g., Admission, PartII, supra note 89, at 23 (statement of Attorney
General Griffin Bell).
94. See, e.g., Hearings on Admission, supra note 89, at 124-25.
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tion,"5 neither was formally enacted into law.
The next piece of significant legislation was the Refugee and
Displaced Persons Act of 197896 proposed by Senator Kennedy on
March 15, 1978. By giving the executive branch even more discretion than the executive branch wanted, this proposal differed radically from past congressional attempts to restructure the refugee
policy.9 7 This obvious political move to force the Administration

to come forth with specific reform proposals proved to be successful. The Administration unveiled its proposals on the last day of
congressional hearings on the proposed legislation., 8 These proposals basically reiterated the previous testimony of Administration officials.99 Although the Subcommittee did not adopt either
Senator Kennedy's bill or the Administration's proposals, the
hearings concluded on a positive note with both sides agreeing to
work together toward a consensus, a comprehensive reform package to be introduced during the next session of Congress. 100
C.

Asylum Law

-

1980 and Beyond

1. The Refugee Act of 1980
The negotiations between the executive branch and Congress to
draft a consensus immigration reform bill were successful. Senator Kennedy introduced the compromise bill, S. 643,101 in the
Senate in 1979. Congressman Rodino and Congresswoman Holtzman sponsored the companion bill, H.R. 2816,102 in the House.
The bill contained a proposed refugee definition almost identical
95.

See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 41.

96. S. 2751, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 6978 (1978).
97. For specific provisions of S. 2751, see Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 41 n.150.
98. See Admission, Part II, supra note 89, at 216.
99. For specifics of the Administration's proposals, see Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 42.
100. See Admission, Part II, supra note 89, at 220.
101. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 4863 (1979). Senator Kennedy had become the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee due to Senator Eastland's resignation. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note
1, at 42 n.153. For a detailed discussion of Senator Kennedy's role in immigration reform, see Kennedy, The Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT'L MIGRATION REv.
141 (1981).
102. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 4816 (1979). Congressman Rodino was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, so the new bill
had both Judiciary Committee Chairmen as sponsors.
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to the refugee definition in the Protocol. 10 3 The bill also addressed the numerical and categorical limitations problem by restricting the executive branch's emergency parole authority and
requiring certain congressional consultation.0 Furthermore, the
bill extended the withholding of deportation provision to apply to
exclusion proceedings as well as deportation proceedings 0 5 and to
include "nationality [and] membership in a particular social
group" as additional bases of persecution.10 6 Finally, although the
bill did not expressly limit the Attorney General's parole authority, the specific provisions of the bill regarding parole made it
clear that the executive branch should only use its parole power
107
in very limited instances.
The Senate Judiciary Committee0 " and the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law held hearings on the respective bills. 09 These hearings focused on five general areas: (1) the proper definition of a refugee; (2) the
appropriate numerical limitations on the use of the parole power;
(3) the proposed changes in the withholding of deportation provision of the INA; (4) the benefits of a statutory asylum provision;
and (5) the proper consultation procedure. 10°

103. See H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 201(a), 125 CONG. REc. 37,242
(1979).
104. Id. § 201(b). These congressional consultation requirements, however,
were not as extensive as those that Congressman Eilberg had proposed and did
not include a legislative veto provision. Anker & Posner, Legislative History,
supra note 1, at 44.
105. H.R. 2816, supra note 103, § 203(e); Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 45. "Excludable aliens" are those considered to have
stopped at the border even though they physically are present in the United
States. Note, Asylum, supra note 19, at 1128; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982).
106. H.R. 2816, supra note 103, § 203(e).
107. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 45.
108. Senator Kennedy, in an effort to gain more power on immigration reform, abolished the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration when he became
Chairman of the full Judiciary Committee. See Anker & Posner, Legislative
History, supra note 1, at 45 n.172.
109. See The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 643 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Refugee Act of 1979:
Hearingson H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
110. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 45-46. For an
overview of the committee hearings on these five points, see id. at 46-50. An indepth discussion of the numerical allocations and the consultation procedures

892

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18.875

The hearings resulted in several amendments that were incorporated into the Senate and House reports on the bill.11 ' The
House Committee amended its version to add a provision specifically including detainees and political prisoners in the definition
of a refugee." 2 The Senate version contained an amendment
bringing displaced persons within the refugee definition." 3 The
House report's definition of a refugee also expressly excluded any
alien who had persecuted others." 4 Additionally, both the Senate
and the House established a statutory asylum provision." 5 The
House version gave the Attorney General discretionary authority
to grant asylum, while the Senate made the grant mandatory if
the alien qualified under the statute."' Lastly, both the Senate
and House Committee rejected the discretionary element in the
withholding of deportation provision and provided mandatory
withholding of deportation for an alien qualifying under the
statute."'
The differences between the House and Senate versions of the
bill, as well as some additional amendments that were added during House and Senate floor action," 8 made a conference committee necessary. The Conference Committee opted essentially for
the House version of the refugee definition.2 9 The final draft defined a refugee as:
are beyond the scope of this Article.
111, S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
112. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 50-51 &
n.203. Detainees and political prisoners are defined as "any person who is within
the country of such person's nationality, or in the case of a person having no
nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and
who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution ....

."

H.R.

REP. No. 608, supra note 111, at 38.
113. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 51. Displaced persons were defined as "any person who [has] been displaced by military or civil
disturbance or uprooted because of arbitrary detention, and who is unable to
return to his usual place of abode." S. REP. No. 256, supra note 111, at 20.
114. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 111, at 10.
115. See id. at 17, S. REP. No. 256, supra note 111, at 9.
116. Compare H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 111, at 17-18 with S. REP. No.
256, supra note 111, at 9.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 111, at 18; S. REP. No. 256, supra
note 111, at 17.
118. For a discussion of floor action in both chambers, see Anker & Posner,
Legislative History, supra note 1, at 56-60.
119. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
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any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion ....
120
The definition also included displaced persons by allowing the
President to designate certain individuals within their own country as refugees under certain conditions.1 2 1 Finally, the bill expressly excluded anyone who had persecuted or participated in
1 22
the persecution of another individual.
The Conference Committee also adopted the House version of
the statutory asylum provision that read as follows:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien
physically present in the United States or at a land border or port
of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum,
and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this
123
title.
The Committee chose this version to give the Attorney General
discretion in deciding whether to grant asylum. The Conference
Committee rejected the Senate version that would have required
a grant of asylum to be mandatory for aliens qualifying as
24
refugees.L
Further, the Conference Committee adopted the provision
mandating withholding of deportation for all aliens qualifying
under the withholding of deportation statute.125 The Committee,
however, established four exceptions to the mandatory withholding of deportation rule. 2 6 These exceptions coincided with those

120. Id. at 24 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1982)).
121. Id. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1982)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 21 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)).
124. Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 62; see also supra
note 116 and accompanying text.
125. S. REP. No. 590, supra note 119, at 20.
126. The exceptions are when:
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
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set forth in the Protocol. 127 The new withholding of deportation

provision read as follows:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien... to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race,
membership in a particular social group, or
religion, nationality,
128
opinion.
political
The Committee's inclusion of the words "or return" in the new
provision extended coverage to excludable aliens as well as those
legally within the country.1 29 Finally, the Conference Committee
repealed the conditional entry provisions. 13 0
The Conference Committee then returned its report to the in-

dividual chambers for final action. Most of the House debate focused on the Conference Committee's deletion of the legislative
veto provision from the consultation requirements of the bill
which raised the ire of several House members. 31 One member
even suggested returning the bill to the Conference Committee
with instructions to "clean it up and do it right."13 2 This conflict
regarding the legislative veto provision almost resulted in the loss

of the entire bill. The House finally approved the measure on
March 4, 1980, by a vote of only 207 to 192 with 34 members

abstaining.133 The Senate's reception of the Conference Commitbership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United
States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to arrival
of the alien in the United States; or

(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to
the security of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1982).
127. See Convention, supra note 34, arts. 31, 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6275-76, 189
U.N.T.S. at 174, 176 (incorporated by reference at Protocol, supra note 3, art. I,
§ 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268).
128, S. REP.No. 590, supra note 119, at 7 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)
(1982)).
129. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
130, Refugee Act § 203(b)(1), 94 Stat. at 107.
131. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 63.
132. 126 CONG. REc. 4498 (1980) (statement of Congressman Butler).
133. Id. at 4508.
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tee report was in marked contrast to that of the House.13 4 With
little debate the Senate unanimously approved the measure on
February 26, 1980.15 The President then signed the Refugee Act
of 1980 into law on March 17, 1980.1386
2. BIA and Court Response to the Refugee Act
The BIA wasted little time in dashing the hopes of Refugee Act
proponents who wanted a more humanitarian approach to refugees under United States law. 137 Before enactment of the Refugee
Act, the BIA had admitted that the "good reason to fear persecution" test under the conditional entry provision 38 was less stringent than the "clear probability of persecution" test under the
withholding of deportation provision. 39 Yet, after enactment of
the Refugee Act, the BIA viewed the "well-founded fear of persecution" language in the new refugee provision as interchangeable
with the stringent clear probability test applied to withholding of
deportation claims. In short, the BIA applied the clear
probability standard to claims for withholding of deportation and
claims for asylum.

40

Thus, the burden on the alien actually in-

134. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 64.
135.

126 CONG. REC. 3758 (1980).

136. 94 Stat. 118 (1980).
137. See Anker & Posner, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 11, 48-49, 60.
Commentators generally agree that Congress intended to create equivalent eligibility standards under the asylum and withholding of deportation provisions.
Congress meant for the lesser "well-founded fear of persecution" burden to apply to both provisions. See, e.g., Helton, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 13, at
252; Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations
under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618, 625 (1981); Comment,
Refuge in America, supra note 3, at 101; Note, Asylum, supra note 19, at 1137;
Note, A Comparative Overview of the Vietnamese and Cuban Refugee Crises:
Did the Refugee Act of 1980 Change Anything?, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 25,
46 (1982).
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A)(i) (1976). See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., In re Janus, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (B.I.A. 1968); In re Tan,
12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 569-70 (B.I.A. 1967).
140. See, e.g., In re Martinez-Romero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75 (B.I.A. 1981); In re
Lain, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15 (B.I.A. 1981); In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec.
465 (B.I.A. 1980).
The continuing role of ideology in asylum determinations further frustrated
the Refugee Act proponents. INS statistics for the 1983 fiscal year show that
78% of all Russian applicants, 64% of all Ethiopian applicants, and 53% of all
Afghan applicants received asylum. Meanwhile only 11% of all Filipine appli-
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creased under the BIA's interpretation of the Refugee Act.
Stevic v. Sava' 4 1 was the first case to interpret the Refugee

Act's effect on the burden of proof issue. Stevic involved a Yugoslav citizen who came to the United States to visit his sister. His
sister had married a citizen of the United States and was a permanent resident of the same country.

42

Stevic did not leave the

United States when his visa expired. The immigration judge ordered Stevic deported. During this time,143Stevic requested neither
asylum nor withholding of deportation.

Stevic later moved to reopen his deportation proceedings for
purposes of pursuing a withholding of deportation claim under
the INA." 4 The immigration judge denied this motion and the

BIA affirmed, stating that Stevic had not shown a clear
1 45
probability of persecution if he were returned to Yugoslavia.
Stevic did not appeal the BIA decision. He later filed another motion to reopen his hearing before the BIA. 46 The BIA denied this
motion on the same grounds. 47 Stevic appealed this decision to
the Second Circuit, arguing that due to the recent passage of the
Refugee Act, the BIA had applied the wrong burden of proof in
the second request for reopening. 48
In Stevic the Second Circuit extensively reviewed the legislative history of the Refugee Act. 49 It focused on the changes in the
relevant statutory language of the withholding of deportation provision. The court noted Congress' intention to conform to the
cants, 2% of all Haitian applicants, 2% of all Guatemalan applicants, and 3% of
all Salvadoran applicants were afforded this privilege. Helton, Unfulfilled Prom-

ise, supra note 13, at 253 (citing INS statistics on file with that author).
141. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct.
2489 (1984).
142. Id. at 402.
143. Id.
144. Stevic claimed that his participation in an anti-Communist organization
while in the United States would subject him to persecution if he were returned

to Yugoslavia. Id. at 403.
145. Id.
146. Stevic also sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Stevic appealed the denial of
habeas corpus relief, and the Second Circuit consolidated it with his appeal of

the BIA's action. Id. at 402-03. For the court's treatment of the habeas corpus
appeal, see id. at 404.
147. Id. at 403-04.
148. Id. at 404.
149. Id. at 404-09.
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Protocol, and expressed serious doubts that Congress intended to
create a stiffer burden of proof than the burden previously applied under the old conditional entry provision. 150 The Stevic appellate court concluded that the Refugee Act had changed the
burden of proof in withholding of deportation cases to the lesser
standard of a well-founded fear of persecution. Thus, the court
remanded the case to the BIA for a determination based on the
"well-founded fear" burden of proof.15 The court made no effort
to elaborately define well-founded fear, but recommended that
the BIA look to legislative intent, the U.N. Handbook,
153
experience in making its determination.

52

and past

The Third Circuit in Rejaie v. INS,15 4 was the second court of
appeals to confront the burden of proof issue. The petitioner in
Rejaie was an Iranian who came to the United States in 1978 to
attend school. He did not want to return to Iran upon the expiration of his visa for fear of persecution by the Ayatollah
Khomeini's regime. Accordingly, he sought withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the INA. An immigration judge
found him deportable.

55

The BIA, in reviewing the immigration

judge's decision, required that Rejaie prove a clear probability of
persecution.1 56 He appealed, claiming that the proper standard of
57
proof was a well-founded fear of persecution.

Like the Second Circuit in Stevic, the Third Circuit in Rejaie
also looked at the legislative history of the Refugee Act. 5 , In
150. Id. at 408-09.
151. Id. at 409.
152. See supra note 35.
153. Stevic, 678 F.2d at 409.
154. 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
155. Id. at 141.
156. Id. at 140.
157. See id. at 142.
158. Id. at 142-45. The Supreme Court recently held that unexplained delay
in processing an importer's § 618 petition for mitigation did not deprive the
importer of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Von Neumann, - U.S.
, 106 S.Ct. 610 (1986),
an importer's automobile was seized when he failed to declare it to Customs in
violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1497. Customs returned the vehicle after 14 days, when
the importer posted a bond, and it imposed and collected a mitigated penalty
some 36 days after the importer filed its § 618 petition. Justice Brennan, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that the § 618 mitigation process was "constitutionally irrelevant", since the statute ".

.

. simply grants the [Treasury] Secretary

the discretion not to pursue a complete forfeiture despite the Government's en-
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Rejaie, however, the court focused on different parts of the history not considered by the Second Circuit in Stevic. In particular,
the Rejaie court emphasized a portion of the House report which
stated: "Although [section 243(h)] has been held by court and
administrative decisions to accord to aliens the protection required under Article 33, the committee feels it desirable, for the
sake of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the
Convention.' 15 9 In other words, the court felt that the amendments to section 243(h) in the Refugee Act were merely procedural rather than substantive. 60°
The majority also expressed three major criticisms of the Second Circuit's opinion in Stevic. First, the Rejaie court claimed
that the Second Circuit in Stevic attributed too stringent a test to
the clear probability burden.' 6 ' Second, the Rejaie court, unlike
the Stevic court, claimed that prior case law established the
equivalence of the two burdens.

62

Third, the Rejaie court criti-

cized the Stevic court's analysis of the legislative history of the
Refugee Act.16 3 The Rejaie court concluded that there was no difference in the burdens of proof that should be applied to withholding of deportation claims and asylum claims. Finally, the
court held that the
clear probability test should be applied in the
64

Rejaie decision.1

Reyes v. INS 6 5 was the next case addressing the burden of
proof issue. Reyes involved a Filipino who entered the United
States as a nonimmigrant exchange student. When she did not

-,
and is not an essential step in the extintitlement to one." 106 S. Ct. at
guishment of an importer's property right.
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, suggested that despite the constitutional irrelevance of the mitigation procedure, the statute implicitly commands
the Secretary to act diligently. Id. at
159. Id. at 145 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979))
(emphasis added by the court).
160. The Third Circuit apparently felt that the Refugee Act was merely procedural housekeeping legislation in that it effected no change in substantive
United States immigration law. See Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 144-45.
161. Id. at 146.
162. Id. The Court relied most heavily upon Kashani v. INS, 548 F.2d 376
(7th Cir. 1977), a pre-Refugee Act case which stated that the two standards "will
in practice converge." 548 F.2d at 379.
163. See Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 146.
164. Id.
165. 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2173 (1985).
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return to the Philippines upon expiration of her visa, the government instituted deportation proceedings against her. She admitted deportability, but she sought withholding of deportation
under section 243(h) of the INA. 16 The immigration judge denied
her request and the BIA affirmed, after applying the clear
probability standard. 117 In Reyes, in a short opinion, the Sixth
Circuit quoted Stevic with approval and held that the more stringent clear probability test was inappropriate after enactment of
the Refugee Act.168 This conflict among the circuits6 9 led the
United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Stevic v.
Sava. 7 0 The stage was finally set for a definitive interpretation of
the Refugee Act's effect on the burden of proof issue.

III. Stevic

-

ITS MESSAGE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

A.

The Court's Opinion

When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Stevic,'7 1 most observers felt that the Court would clarify whether
"clear probability" remained the proper burden of proof in withholding of deportation cases under section 243(h) of the INA after the Refugee Act. Observers also hoped that the Court would
set forth the proper burden for political asylum claims under Section 208(a) of the INA. The parties took the same positions as
they had in the lower court. The Government argued that the two
standards were interchangeable, but that if there was a difference
in them, the legislative history of the Refugee Acts showed that
Congress did not mean to lessen the clear probability burden in
166. Id. at 598.
167. Id. at 599.

168. Id. at 599-600.
169. See also Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 563 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984)
(declining to decide whether the proper burden of proof is clear probability or
well-founded fear, but treating a request for political asylum filed during deportation proceedings as identical to an application for withholding of deportation);
Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d 831, 835 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) (declining to choose the
appropriate burden of proof, but treating a section 243(h) claim as the alien's
only available asylum claim).
170. 104 S. Ct. at 2492.
171. For the facts and the lower court's holding in Stevic, see supra notes
141-53 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court set the case for oral argument on Dec. 6, 1983. Butterfield, An Array of Arguments in Stevic, 12 IhMuGRATION

NEWSLETTER

Arguments].

3 (1983)

[hereinafter cited as Butterfield, Stevic
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withholding of deportation cases. Stevic, on the other hand, argued that the standards of proof were different and that the Protocol placed only a well-founded fear burden
on an alien seeking
2
asylum or withholding of deportation.1

Twenty-eight parties filed amici curiae briefs in this case which
came to be one of the most controversial and hotly debated cases
of the term. 173 The National Immigration Project,'74 in its amicus
brief, argued that Congress intended for the Refugee Act to conform to the Protocol. Accordingly, it argued that the well-founded
fear burden was the appropriate standard in both section 243(h)
withholding of deportation claims and section 208(a) asylum
claims. It also argued that the Protocol interpreted the wellfounded fear language to mean "credible evidence of a reasonable
fear of persecution." 7 5 The National Immigration Project admitted that the well-founded fear and clear probability language had
been used interchangeably at times, but argued that immigration
officials required a higher level of proof under the clear
probability label. Noting that the lower courts improperly applied
varied formulations of the clear probability test, the brief urged
the Court to discard the clear probability language.1 6 The Project
concluded that, in view of the possible life or death consequences
of an asylum determination:
172. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
173. See Butterfield, Stevic Arguments, supra note 171, at 3-5.
174. Twenty-two other organizations signed onto the National Immigration
Project's brief rather than filing their own. Id. at 4. The signatories included the
following: American Friends Service Committee, New England Regional Office;
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF); Asian Law
Caucus, Inc.; Bay Area Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project; Center for Immigrants' Rights (CIR); Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN); Central
American Refugee Defense Fund (CARDF); Chicago Religious Task Force on
Central America (CRTFCA); El Rescate; El Salvador Lawyers Committee of
Denver; Haitian Refugee Center (HRC); Justice and Peace Office of the Archdiocese of Denver; La Raza Legal Alliance; Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service of the Lutheran Council in the United States of America; Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF); National Center for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc.; National Ministries of the American Baptist Churches
in the U.S.A.; Salvador Refugee Coalition of Denver; Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force for Central America; Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
(UUSC); Washington Association of Churches; and Willamette Valley Immigration Project.
Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 3 (quoting National Immigration Project Brief).
176. Id. at 4.
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proving a well-founded fear of persecution requires than [sic] an
applicant demonstrate a reasonable basis to fear persecution. The
reasonableness of the fear is evaluated by considering a totality of
the circumstances, including the objective background situation in
the country of origin, the subjective perceptions of the applicant,
and the credibility of the applicant, An asylum applicant should
not be required to prove that he will be persecuted or that persecution is more probable than not. It is enough if the applicant submits evidence, which fairly evaluated, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he might be persecuted, i.e., that persecution is
17 7
reasonably possible.
All of the other amici briefs, including that of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, advocated basically the same
71
position.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a relatively detailed
look at the legislative history and prior case law leading up to the
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.Y17 The Court then looked
at the Refugee Act itself. Noting that Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act amended the language of Section 243(h) of the INA to
coincide with Article 33 of the Convention, the Court found that
none of these changes expressly or impliedly had changed the
standard of proof necessary under section 243(h). The Court reasoned that, even with these amendments, "the text of the statute
simply does not specify how great a possibility of persecution
must exist to qualify the alien for withholding of deportation."' 180
The Court also recognized that the language of section 243(h)
does not contain the term "refugee," nor does it refer to section
101(a)(42)(A) which defines "refugee."' 8'
The Court also rejected the argument that regulations promulgated under the Refugee Act established the well-founded fear
burden as the appropriate standard under section 243(h). Although requests for asylum filed after institution of deportation
proceedings would also be considered as requests for withholding
of deportation, 8 2 the Court reasoned that this fact did not expand the well-founded fear burden to section 243(h) cases. In-

177. Steinberg, The Standard After Stevic, supra note 10, at 7 (quoting
from National Immigration Project Brief).
178. See Butterfield, Stevic Arguments, supra note 171, at 4.
179. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2493-96.
180. Id. at 2496-97.
181. Id. at 2497-498.
182. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1983).
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stead, the regulation merely eliminated the need for filing an additional claim for withholding of deportation. *s3
Before analyzing the legislative history of the Refugee Act, the
Court summarily held that "clear probability" meant that the
standard was "whether it is more likely than not that the alien
would be subject to persecution. 18 4 The Court reached this conclusion without any reference to the varying applications of the
standard in past cases. The Court also dismissed the argument
that the BIA had applied a clear and convincing standard in the
Stevic case.1 8 5 Finally, in its last statement before examining the
legislative history of the Refugee Act, the Court made its only
reference toward the resolution of the issue of whether the two
standards are interchangeable. The Court stated, "[flor purposes
of our analysis, we may assume . . . that the well-founded-fear
standard is more generous than the clear-probability-of-persecution standard ..
"186
In its examination of the legislative history of the Refugee Act,
the Court went to great lengths to separate the asylum provision
from the withholding provision. It quoted from the House Committee report to support its basic premise that the changes to section 243(h) were merely procedural rather than substantive.187
The Court concluded its legislative history analysis by finding
that Congress did not intend for an alien to be entitled to withholding of deportation simply by qualifying as a refugee. Instead,
Congress meant for the alien to qualify for withholding of deportation only after meeting the clear probability standard of
proof.18 8
The Court unanimously concluded that the legislative history,
the statutory language, and prior case law dictated a clear
probability standard, which it defined as more likely than not, for
withholding of deportation claims.18 9 The Court, therefore, reversed the Second Circuit's opinion and remanded the case to be
considered under the clear probability burden. It expressly refused to resolve the meaning of the well-founded fear language,

183. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2497 n.18.
184. Id. at 2498.
185. Id. at 2498 n.19.
186. Id. at 2498.
187. Id. at 2499 & n.20.
188. Id. at 2500.
189. Id. at 2501.
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stating that this case did not raise that issue. 190 Thus, by implication, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether the two standards are coterminous.
B.

The Lower Courts' Interpretations

Carvajal-Munoz v. INS 1 91 was one of the first cases which attempted to interpret the Supreme Court's holding in Stevic. In
Carvajal-Munoz, the Seventh Circuit reviewed denial of an asylum application and a withholding of deportation application. An
immigration judge and the BIA both had rejected the claims by
the petitioner, a native of Chile and former citizen of Argentina. 192 The court eventually upheld the BIA's result on both applications,""3 but in so doing, it outlined the procedure for determining withholding of deportation and asylum claims and the
proper procedure for appellate review.
The court first noted the discretionary aspects of the asylum
provision as opposed to the mandatory nature of the withholding
of deportation provision. Because of this distinction, the majority
opined that the determinations for each should be made on separate records if possible. The court, however, recognized that efficiency sometimes necessitated only one record for both decisions,
particularly when an alien applies for asylum after deportation
proceedings have begun.""
The court then addressed the burden of proof necessary under
each provision. It held that the clear probability standard was appropriate for the section 243(h) claim, but it concluded that the
well-founded fear standard was proper under section 208(a). 195
The court relied exclusively on Stevic in determining the proper
withholding of deportation standard, and it also relied on Stevic
in determining the proper asylum burden. 96 Furthermore, the
court held that courts should review section 243(h) claims under
the substantial evidence test, rather than an abuse of discretion
standard, because the grant was now mandatory if the alien quali-

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 573.
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fled under the statute. 19 7 Last, the court reasoned that the discretionary determination of whether to grant asylum must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; however, the
preliminary determination of whether the alien meets the definition of a refugee must be reviewed under the substantial evidence
test."'8
Hopes for uniformity after Carvajal-Munoz were short-lived. In
Sotto v. INS,1 99 the Third Circuit adopted a very different interpretation of Stevic. Sotto involved a citizen of the Philippines
who sought political asylum under section 208(a) and withholding
of deportation under section 243(h) after deportation proceedings
had begun.2 00 The immigration judge and the BIA denied both

claims. As in Carvajal-Munoz, the court held that Stevic controlled review of the withholding of deportation claim. Thus, the
court applied the clear probability standard to that claim. 201 Re-

garding the asylum claim, however, the court noted that Stevic
had left the burden of proof question open.20 2 The court went on
to hold that, in light of this fact, its earlier decision in Rejaie v.
INS 20 3 controlled on the burden of proof issue. Rejaie had held
that the two burdens are coterminous. Therefore, the court concluded that the clear probability standard applied not only to the
withholding of deportation claim but also to the asylum claim. 2 "
The Sotto court also differed from the Carvajal-Munoz court in
that the Sotto court reviewed the section 243(h) claim under an
abuse of discretion test rather than under a substantial evidence
205

test.

In Youkhanna v. INS 206 the Sixth Circuit also addressed the
ramifications of Stevic. The petitioners, a married couple from
Iraq, appealed from the BIA's denial of their asylum and with-

197. Id. at 569. The Stevic Court did not address the issue of the proper

standard of judicial review.
198. Id. at 567.
199. 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984).
200. Id. at 833.
201. Id. at 836.
202. Id.

203. 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982). See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying
text.
204. Sotto, 748 F.2d at 836; accord Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1985).

205. 748 F.2d at 837.
206. 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984).
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holding of deportation claims.2 07 The court adopted a position

similar to the Seventh Circuit's Carvajal-Munoz decision on the
burden of proof issue. It concluded that Stevic mandated a clear
probability standard for the withholding of deportation claim and
cited Carvajal-Munoz with approval in adopting a lesser wellfounded fear burden for the asylum claim. 20 8 The court disagreed
with the Seventh Circuit, however, on the judicial review standard. The Youkhanna court, like the Third Circuit in Sotto, applied an abuse of discretion standard to the section 243(h)
claim.

20 9

In adopting the abuse of discretion standard, the Youkhanna
court cited Dally v. INS.210 In Dally, a post-Stevic case, the petitioner appealed a BIA denial of his withholding of deportation
claim. 2n The petitioner also had sought political asylum, but that
issue was not on appeal. The court, however, stated in a footnote
that the asylum claim had been raised after the beginning of deportation proceedings and that such claims must come under the
clear probability standard. The court cited the language of the
relevant regulation in support of its position.2 12 Apparently, the

Dally court's decision means that an asylum claim filed before a
deportation proceeding must show a well-founded fear of persecution, while asylum claims filed after the deportation proceedings
have begun must show a clear probability of persecution. No
other court has adopted this novel interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit set forth its interpretation of Stevic in Bola207. Id. at 361.
208. Id. at 362. This holding appears to conflict with Reyes v. INS, 747 F.2d
1045 (6th Cir. 1984), in which the court held that the clear probability standard
applied to asylum and withholding of deportation claims. This apparent conflict,
however, may only be the result of the Reyes court's improper use of the term
"asylum." Although the court stated that the alien sought "asylum or withholding of deportation," it referred only to § 243(h) of the INA as the basis of the
claim. See id. at 1046. Thus, the alien may only have applied for withholding of
deportation. This interpretation receives support from Moosa v. INS, 760 F.2d
715 (6th Cir. 1985). The Moosa court cited both Reyes and Youkhanna in concluding that well-founded fear is a less stringent burden than clear probability.
Moosa, 760 F.2d at 718-19; see also Dolores v. INS, 772 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1985).
209. Youkhanna, 749 F.2d at 362 n.2.
210. 744 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1984).
211. Id. at 1192.
212. Id. at 1196 n.6. The Sixth Circuit also took this same position in Moosa,
760 F.2d at 719.
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nos-Hernandez v. INS. 213 Bolanos-Hernandez involved an alien

from El Salvador who illegally entered the United States in September of 1982. During deportation hearings commenced against
him the following month, he requested withholding of deportation
and political asylum. 214 The immigration judge denied his re-

quests on both counts. The BIA affirmed, holding that the alien
failed to meet either the clear probability or well-founded fear
standard. 21 5' After a thorough review of the statutory framework

and case law, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA, holding that
the petitioner had established his right to withholding of deportation and that he also qualified for political asylum.6
In reaching this conclusion, the court first addressed the question of the proper standard of judicial review. The Bolanos-Hernandez court, much like the Seventh Circuit in CarvajalMunoz,

217

reasoned that the mandatory nature of the withholding

of deportation provision required a substantial evidence test
rather than the abuse of discretion test which had been applied
prior to enactment of the Refugee Act.218 The Ninth Circuit also
found that the asylum claim should receive a two-tiered standard
of review. The determination of whether the alien meets the definition of a refugee should be reviewed under a substantial evidence test. If that definition is met, the court then should review
the Attorney General's 219
grant or denial of asylum under an abuse
of discretion standard.

The court then examined the issue of whether the well-founded
fear standard is more generous than the clear probability standard. It noted that the Supreme Court in Stevic had assumed
that well-founded fear was a less stringent burden of proof but
that the Court had not actually resolved the issue. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, in fact, the well-founded fear standard did
213. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985). While the Ninth Circuit earlier confronted the effects of Stevic in Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.
1984), Bolanos-Hernandezcontains a more in-depth look at the state of United
States refugee law after Stevic. For later Ninth Circuit cases following BolanosHernandez, see Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1985); Cardoza-Fonseca v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
214. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1280.
215. Id. at 1283.
216. Id. at 1288.
217. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
218. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1282 n.8.
219. Id. at 1282 n.9.
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not place as heavy a burden on the alien as did the clear
probability standard. In so finding, the court reasoned that Congress felt that, in obtaining mandatory withholding of deportation, aliens should carry a higher burden than the burden required to establish eligibility for a discretionary grant of
220
asylum.

The court criticized the BIA for not considering the claims separately in this case. The court held that the proper procedure is
first to consider the section 243(h) withholding of deportation
claim under the more stringent clear probability test. If an alien
meets the clear probability standard, the inquiry can stop at that
point because he or she obviously also meets the well-founded
fear burden applicable to the asylum claim. If, however, the alien
fails to satisfy the clear probability burden, the court should determine if the alien qualifies as a refugee for asylum purposes
under the lesser well-founded fear standard. 22' The court then

closely scrutinized all of the evidence in the case and concluded

that the petitioner satisfied both burdens of proof.222

IV.

ANALYsis

A. The Failwre of the Refugee Act-Who Gets the Blame?
The Refugee Act of 1980 supposedly established a uniform and
nonideological refugee eligibility standard.223 Clearly, the above
discussion illustrates that, in this regard, the Refugee Act has
been a dismal failure. The blame for this failure belongs both
with Congress for not establishing its intentions more clearly by
better drafting in the Refugee Act and with the Supreme Court
for its holding in Stevic.
In Stevic, the alien and the amici curiae argued that the wellfounded fear standard applied to both withholding of deportation
claims and asylum requests after enactment of the Refugee Act
and that the well-founded fear standard is less stringent than the
clear probability standard. 224 These arguments are certainly rea-

sonable in light of the language of the Protocol and the legislative
history of the Refugee Act. This position, however, is not as
220. Id. at 1282-83.
221. Id. at 1283.

222. Id. at 1284-88.
223. See Helton, Stevic Implications, supra note 10, at 53.
224. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
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sound as some commentators appear to believe.2 25 The language

from the House Committee report on the Refugee Act cited by
the Stevic Court, although certainly not conclusive, indicates that
the changes made to Section 243(h) of the INA might well have
been only procedural rather than substantive. The language from
the House Committee report says that "the Committee feels it
desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of [section 243(h)] to the Convention.

' 226

The Stevic Court also raised a

valid point when it found that the legislative history of the Refugee Act did not support the theory that Congress intended for
every alien who qualified as a refugee to also be entitled to withholding of deportation.227 Finally, the fact that Congress failed to
include the well-founded fear language or the term "refugee" in
its amendments to section 243(h) weakened the alien's position in
Stevic.
On the other hand, the Court was presented with ample evidence that Congress intended the lesser burden of proof for withholding of deportation claims. The Court failed to even recognize
the strongest evidence of such intent. Although it noted that Congress intended to conform the withholding of deportation provision to Article 33 of the Protocol, the Court focused on the fact
that the language of the amended section 243(h) does not include
the term "refugee.

'22 8

What the Court failed to address, however,

was the fact that article 33-the very article after which the
changes to section 243(h) were modeled-specifically includes the
term "refugee.

2

29

The refugee language in the Protocol, coupled

with the congressional intent to conform United States law with
the Protocol, presented sufficient proof for the Court to discard
the clear probability standard and to adopt instead a uniform approach under a lesser well-founded fear standard for both withholding of deportation claims and asylum claims.
225. See, e.g., Helton, Stevic Implications, supra note 10, at 53.
226. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489 n.20 (quoting H.R. REP.No. 608, supra note 111,

at 18).
227. See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2500.
228. Id. at 2497.

229. See Convention, supra note 34, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S.
at 176 (incorporated by reference at Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, § 2, 19 U.S.T.
at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268); see also Helton, Stevic Implications, supra note
10, at 53.
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B.

The Stevic Approach and Its Interpretations

Perhaps the most amazing aspect of the Stevic opinion is the
unanimity of the Court on such a controversial issue. For nine
Justices, ranging from Rehnquist on the right to Brennan on the
left, to agree on an issue as politically oriented as immigration law
is, at first glance, practically unprecedented. A closer look at this
situation, however, provides a possible explanation of the unanimous result. The Court did not issue its opinion until six months
after hearing oral arguments in the case. 230 At that time, the case
was one of the oldest on the Court's docket. This delay could well
indicate that the Court had reached an impasse on the asylum
issue, particularly in light of the eventual extremely narrow holding in the case. The Justices apparently chose to compromise on a
unanimous, very narrow opinion rather than have another fragmented opinion in an important area 2 3 1 This theory gains further
support from the fact that Justice Stevens, known as one of the
"swing" Justices, wrote the opinion for the Court.
Although a fragmented opinion could have caused numerous
problems in subsequent cases, the Court did not escape these
problems through its narrow holding. By not resolving the issue
of whether the two burdens of proof are coterminous, and if not
coterminous, the proper definition of the well-founded fear standard, the Court did not address one of the major points of conflict
among the circuits. 3 2 The Court also failed to address another
important point by concluding summarily that clear probability
meant "more likely than not"25 3 without any examination of case
law or administrative decisions. Even a cursory review of prior
circuit court cases would have shown the wide range of interpretations of the clear probability test.23 4 The Court should have addressed the proper interpretation of clear probability more thoroughly to provide better guidance in future cases. A final criticism
of the Stevic opinion is that the Court did not even mention
whether the BIA's withholding of deportation determination
should be reviewed on a substantial evidence test or an abuse of
230. The Court heard oral arguments on Dec. 6, 1983, and issued the opinion
on June 5, 1984. 104 S. Ct. at 2489.
231. See Steinberg, The Standard After Stevic, supra note 10, at 6 (quoting
N.Y. Times, June 6, 1984, at A23, coL 2).
232. See supra notes 141-70 and accompanying text.
233. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2498.
234. See Steinberg, The StandardAfter Stevic, supra note 10, at 1, 6.
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discretion test.
Subsequent cases quickly demonstrated these shortcomings.
The Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit held that the wellfounded fear burden applied to asylum cases and that it was more
generous than the clear probability burden.2 5 The Sixth Circuit
adopted a hybrid formulation of the proper burden of proof. The
Sixth Circuit suggested that the well-founded fear standard applied to asylum claims made before the start of deportation proceedings, 236 while the clear probability standard applied if asylum
requests were made after the deportation proceedings had begun.237 The Third Circuit held that the clear probability standard
applied to both asylum and withholding of deportation claims. 3 8
Further, some courts reviewed section 243(h) claims under the
substantial evidence test while others used the abuse of discretion
standard. 239 All of these inconsistencies can be directly attributed
to the Supreme Court's lack of guidance in Stevic.
Of all the post-Stevic cases, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bolanos-Hernandez240 presents the most thorough and well-reasoned approach to the entire disposition of section 243(h) and
section 208(a) claims. As Bolanos-Hernandez points out, Stevic
mandates the use of the clear probability standard for withholding of deportation claims. Based on the legislative history and the
language of the Refugee Act, a less stringent well-founded fear
standard is appropriate for asylum requests.2 41 First, the Immigration Judge and the BIA should determine if the alien meets
the clear probability standard for withholding of deportation. If
he does, the process can stop at that point because he obviously
235.
1282.
236.
237.
238.

See Carvajal-Munoz,743 F.2d at 573; Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at
See Youkhanna, 749 F.2d at 362.
See Dally, 744 F.2d at 1196 n.6.
See Sotto, 748 F.2d at 836.

239. For a listing of cases on both sides of the issue, see Carvajal-Munoz,

743 F.2d at 569.
240. See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.

241. There is absolutely no support for the Sixth Circuit's position in Dally
and Moosa that an asylum claim filed after the beginning of deportation should

be evaluated under the clear probability standard. The footnote in Stevic which
the Sixth Circuit cites as the basis for its position clearly does not suggest any

such position. The Stevic court noted that "[8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b)] simply does
not speak to the burden of proof issue; rather it merely eliminates the need for

filing a separate request for § 243(h) relief if a section 208 claim has been
made." Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2497 n.18. (emphasis added).
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also meets the well-founded fear burden required for asylum eligibility.242 If, however, the alien does not meet the clear probability
standard, his eligibility for asylum should be determined using a
lesser well-founded fear burden. A court should review the withholding of deportation determination under the substantial evidence test because the Attorney General no longer has any discretion under the withholding of deportation provision. The asylum
claims should be reviewed first under the substantial evidence
test to see if the alien qualifies as a refugee because that determination involves no discretion; however, the actual grant or denial
of asylum by the Attorney General is discretionary and should be
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
C.

Possible Legislative Reaction

Even if the Supreme Court finally resolves the issues left open
in Stevic, the uniform, nonideological standard, which congressional sponsors of the Refugee Act had hoped to create, will still
be only a dream. The only real solution is legislative action. One
proposal currently before Congress is a provision of the comprehensive Simpson-Mazzoli immigration reform bill.243 That bill
would amend section 243(h) of the INA by adding the following
paragraph:
An application for relief under this subsection shall be considered
to be an application for asylum under section 208 and shall be considered in accordance with the procedures set forth in that
44
section.
If Congress enacts this provision, it would address one of the
problems with the Stevic decision in that section 243(h) would
then include language indicating that the well-founded fear standard is relevant to that section.24 5
While the Simpson-Mazzoli provision would be better than no
congressional action at all, it probably does not provide the clarity needed for the desired uniform standard. The Third Circuit's
242. An alien most likely would want to continue pursuing the asylum claim
even if he qualifies for withholding of deportation because withholding is only
temporary, while asylum can possibly lead to permanent residence in the United
States. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1288 & n.19.
243. Simpson-Mazzoli is S. 529 and H.R. 1510 in the current session of Congress. Helton, Stevic Implications, supra note 10, at 54.
244. See Steinberg, The Standard After Stevic, supra note 10, at 8.
245. See id.; see also Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2498.
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approach of treating the two standards as coterminous would not
be affected by this amendment. Thus, the Third Circuit would
continue to apply a more probable than not standard to both
claims, while other Circuits would apply a lower well-founded fear
burden to both claims. In all probability, the only way to accomplish complete uniformity is for Congress to enact a two-part
amendment. First, section 243(h) should be amended by adding
the phrase "the alien has demonstrated by a well-founded fear of
persecution that" after the phrase "if the Attorney General determines that" and before the phrase "such alien's life or freedom."
The statute then would read as follows:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ...

to a

country if the Attorney General determines that the alien has
demonstrated by a well-founded fear of persecution that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country .... 246
The second part of the amendment should define "well-founded
fear of persecution" as it is defined in the U.N. HANDBOOK. 47
V.

CONCLUSION

Both Congress and the Supreme Court must bear the blame for
the failure of the Refugee Act of 1980 to establish a uniform, nonideological standard for refugee eligibility. Congress should have
anticipated the possible problems with the Refugee Act and
should have drafted its provisions more carefully to avoid these
problems. The Supreme Court, however, had a sufficient record
before it in Stevic to put the finishing touches on a uniform standard. While the Stevic holding is not totally without support, it
does appear contrary to the underlying purposes of the Refugee
Act. Additionally, the Supreme Court caused as many problems
with what it did not hold in Stevic as with what it did. Stevic's
extraordinarily narrow holding only perpetuated the long-standing confusion in the lower courts. Lower courts which must follow
Stevic should adopt the logical approach set forth by the Ninth
Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez until some congressional action
can be taken to correct the current confusion. The best course of
action for Congress to follow would be to enact a two-part amend246. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
247. See U.N. HANDBOOK supra note

35, 11 37-50. For an articulation of the
Handbook's definition, see the National Immigration Project's proposed definition in its amicus brief in Stevic, supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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ment to the INA that would insert the well-founded fear language
into section 243(h) add a statutory definition for that term based
upon the guidelines set forth in the U.N. HANDBOOK. Then, and
only then, will the United States have a truly humanitarian refugee eligibility standard based upon the uniform, non-ideological
ideals of the Protocol.
Jeffrey Scott Bivins

